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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Network consists of severely energy constrained sensor nodes and are susceptible to security attacks due to
broadcast communication model. It is necessary to optimize the transmission of packets to reduce the energy consumption.
In addition data has to be encrypted in order to overcome the attack from the compromising nodes. We propose Secure Data
Aggregation for Multiple Queries (SDAMQ) in Wireless Sensor Networks where multiple aggregate queries from the sink are
authenticated and distributed to the sensor nodes. The sensor nodes respond by aggregating data belonging to multiple coexisting
queries into a single packet, there by reducing the transmission cost. The intermediary nodes aggregate the encrypted data using
additively homomorphic encryption. Thus authenticated query propagation combined with homomorphic encryption provide secure
data aggregation at low energy consumption. Simulation results shows that SDAMQ provides better performance.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Twelfth International Multi-Conference on Information
Processing-2016 (IMCIP-2016).
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1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network comprises of a number of sensor nodes that monitor its environment and communicates
its data to the base station using multihop transmission. The Sensor nodes are severely constrained in battery power,
computation and communication capacity and memory. Securing data aggregation in an energy efﬁcient manner is of
primary concern in sensor networks.
The users issue queries into the sensor network through a gateway node called the base station. Multiple queries
may co-exist in the network; aggregating data belonging to multiple queries into a single packet is a challenging
task. Many algorithms were proposed that optimize the route and process single aggregate query. Some applications
require multiple aggregate queries to be processed simultaneously. These algorithms try to remove replicated data that
is common to different queries.
WSNs are vulnerable to security attacks mainly due to its broadcast nature of communication and its open
deployment. An adversary can easily gain control over aggregator node and manipulate the aggregated result or can
∗Corresponding author. Tel: +91-994-555-1881.
E-mail address: eprathima@yahoo.co.in
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Organizing Committee of IMCIP-2016
284   E.G. Prathima et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  89 ( 2016 )  283 – 292 
gain data of all the sensor nodes under this aggregator. Thus providing security while gathering data and performing
aggregation is a matter of concern in wireless sensor networks. The concept of Concealed Data Aggregation
(CDA)1 was introduced where each sensor node transmits the encrypted data and cluster-heads perform additive
or multiplicative operation on the encrypted data. Thus, even if an adversary compromises cluster-heads, it cannot
manipulate the aggregated result. All CDA techniques use privacy homomorphism.
Motivation: Distributed Sensor Network has multiple co-existing queries. If separate packets are to be transmitted
for each query, the communication overhead and hence overall energy consumption of the network increases.
Aggregating data belonging to multiple co-existing queries into a single packet while ensuring data concealment is a
challenging task.
Contribution: The multi-query processing algorithms either optimize the query at the Base Station, or remove
duplicate data belonging to multiple co-existing queries inside the network or may be a combination of both. This
paper integrate additively homomorphic encryption with multi-query processing by which data belonging to different
queries are encrypted using Elliptic Curve Cryptography and then the ciphertexts are aggregated by point addition.
The contributions of the paper include:
1) Authenticated query dissemination and data aggregation
2) Secure Aggregation of data belonging to multiple queries into a single packet using additively homomorphic
encryption.
3) Low energy consumption and enhanced lifetime of WSNs
Organization: This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature survey. Section 3 describes the
preliminaries. Section 4 deﬁnes the problem and describes the system model. Section 5 presents SDAMQ. Section 6
discusses the simulation results and performance analysis. Section 7 contains the conclusions.
2. Literature Survey
2.1 Data aggregation for multiple coexisting queries
Jiang et al.,2 presented a framework for query dissemination and data routing in sensor networks with clients and
fusion servers. Multiple queries from different clients are satisﬁed using light weight fusion algorithms called fuselets.
A dynamic programming sensor based routing strategy is chosen. Overlapped sub-queries from multiple clients can
be merged which increase network utilization and performance.
Trigoni et al.,3 presented a fully distributed query-driven approach that identiﬁes common query sub-aggregates.
It yields high energy efﬁciency in comparison to other tree based approaches.
Xiang et al.,4 proposed an optimized two-tier multiple query optimization scheme (TTMQO) in which the base
station performs the ﬁrst tier of optimization by eliminating redundancies and and the second tier of optimization
happens in-network where several queries that need same data are combined. TTMQO has better performance
in terms of communication cost and scalability but does not address node failures and unreliable transmission
links.
Niedermayer et al.,5 addressed the problem of computing exact quantiles in hierarchical WSNs by employing
either a b-ary search or heuristic solution. The b-ary search is employed when there is very low temporal correlation
between consecutive quantiles. When there is some temporal correlation between consecutive values then, the heuristic
algorithm is employed.
Chakravarthi et al.,6 proposed an efﬁcient multiquery a Modern Query Optimization (MQO), based on shortest path,
trustworthiness of node and energy efﬁcient query processing using Artiﬁcial Immune System (AIS). It is quite fast
and can be extended to distributed, controlled heterogeneous WSNs.
Chen et al.,7 proposed Secure and Efﬁcient Query Processing in Sensor Networks (SafeQ) to prevent unauthorized
information access from both sensor’s data or from queries in a two-tier architecture with storage nodes as
intermediary. Both query and data are encoded in such a way that storage nodes can process the data speciﬁc to
queries without knowing the data and query. In addition neighborhood chains are proposed that can detect if the result
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contains any false contributions. SafeQ shows better performance in terms of power consumption and storage space
when compared to other prior algorithms. It can be adapted to event-driven sensor networks.
Tanuja et al.,8 proposed Secure and Privacy Preserving Data Centric Sensor Networks (SDCS) to secure the data
aggregation in sensor network with storage nodes. SDCS uses two level of keys for providing security and multi-query
optimization technique using Keyed Bloom ﬁlter to reduce the number similar queries. SDCS provides better security
at a lower communication cost.
2.2 Concealed data aggregation
Castelluccia et al.,9 proposed an additively homomorphic encryption scheme that allows intermediary nodes
to aggregate encrypted data and hence provide better privacy than hop-by-hop encryption scheme. The proposed
algorithm is bandwidth efﬁcient and distributes communication load evenly across the sensor network and hence
increases the network lifetime. Peter et al.,1 presented Concealed Data Aggregation (CDA) for providing security to
in-network aggregation. Three PH algorithms were analysed, DFPH proposed by Domingo-Ferrer, CMT Algorithm
proposed by Castelluccia, Mykletun and Tsudik and Elliptic Curve ElGamal (ECEG). CDA comprises of two
approaches, out of which the ﬁrst approach CMT-DF scheme provides better security by combining DFPH with
CMT algorithm and the second approach generate homomorphic message authentication code to address malleability
attacks at an additional communication and computation overhead.
Chan et al.,10 gave a generic construction of CDA based on any public-key homorphic encryption scheme that
is semantically secure and then analysed the performance of two existing schemes WGA (proposed by Westhoff,
J. Girao, and M. Acharya) and CMT (proposed by Castelluccia, Mykletun and Tsudik) and established that the CMT is
semantically secure. In addition they presented a hashed variant of CMT can achieve semantic security and efﬁciency
simultaneously.
He et al.,11 proposed two privacy-preserving aggregation schemes 1) Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation
(CPDA) and 2) Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART) for additive aggregate functions such as sum, count, etc., to bridge
the gap between collaborative data aggregation and data privacy. CPDA utilises the beneﬁts of clustering and algebraic
properties of polynomials whereas SMART is built on slicing technique and associative properties of addition. CPDA
incurs less communication overhead where as SMART incurs less computation overhead.
Huang et al.,12 proposed a secure encrypted-data aggregation scheme where sensors generate a random key during
each data encryption phase and hence provides enhanced semantic security. The proposed scheme is resilient to various
security attacks such as chosen-plaintext attack, known-plaintext attack, ciphertext-only attack and man-in-the-middle
attack. The proposed algorithm incurs low communication overhead and supports only a single aggregation function,
equality check and works under single-level clusters.
Chen et al.,13 introduced the concept of Recoverable Concealed Data Aggregation (RCDA) for homogeneous and
heterogeneous WSNs that allows base station to recover individual sensor’s data even if the data is aggregated by the
cluster-head. Aggregate signature scheme is integrated with RCDA scheme to ensure data integrity and authenticity
and incurs an affordable additional computation and communication cost.
Lin et al.,14 proposed Concealed Data Aggregation Scheme for Multiple Applications in WSNs (CDAMA) where
the base station extracts application speciﬁc aggregate from aggregated ciphertext received. CDAMA allows ciphertext
from different applications to be aggregated without getting mixed and supports secure counting by which base station
gets an exact count of number of messages aggregated. CDAMA can mitigate node compromise attacks and is resilient
to selective or repeated aggregation attacks. Major drawback of CDAMA scheme is the large communication and
computation overhead.
Shim et al.,15 proposed a practical secured data aggregation scheme Sen-SDA based on additive homomorphic
encryption, identity-based signature and batch veriﬁcation. Sen-SDA provides end-to-end conﬁdentiality and
hop-by-hop authentication but at the cost of substantiate amount of communication and computation
overhead.
Prathap et al.,16 presented a review of routing protocols in applications, that meet QoS requirements and
Tarannum et al.,17, Manjula et al.,18 and Kanavalli et al.,19 proposed routing protocols that can improve the network
lifetime.
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3. Preliminaries
Handling of multiple aggregate queries in Sensor Networks is a challenging task. Sensor Networks are vulnerable
to security attacks due to the broadcast nature of communication. This section gives a brief insight into the two
background works that lay a foundation for the development of SDAMQ: 1) SafeQ and 2) CDAMA.
3.1 SafeQ
Chen et al.,7 proposed SafeQ protocol that allows the sink and sensor nodes to exchange data in privacy and integrity
preserving manner in a two-tier sensor network architecture. The two-tier architecture uses mobile sinks as storage
nodes between sensor nodes and the sink. In SafeQ both data and queries are encoded where ﬁrst a preﬁx family is
generated for both data and query range. Next the preﬁxes generated are numericalized. Then a keyed hash message
authentication code (HMAC) is generated using a key g for each numericalized preﬁx. In addition, each sensor node
encrypts the HMACs generated using a key ki that is shared between node i and the sink.
Whenever an encoded query is received at the storage node, it performs query processing by comparing the HMACs
corresponding numericalized preﬁx of the values received from sensor nodes with HMACs of numericalized preﬁx
corresponding to each range a and b sent by sink. If a match is found, then the corresponding encrypted HMAC is
transmitted to the sink. This algorithm can also be used for multi-dimensional data where a single sensor runs multiple
applications and the sensor’s reading becomes a z dimensional data where z represent the number of application. SafeQ
uses neighborhood chaining technique by which the Sink node is able to verify if the result of the query contains any
false contribution.
3.2 CDAMA: Concealed Data Aggregation Scheme for Multiple Applications in wireless sensor networks
Lin et al.,14 proposed a new concealed data aggregation scheme for aggregating data from multiple application into
a single ciphertext. The base station extracts application speciﬁc data from the ﬁnal aggregated ciphertext received.
The sensor nodes are grouped into clusters. Each cluster may have sensor nodes running different applications. Each
Sensor node encrypts the application speciﬁc data and sends to its respective cluster-head. The cluster-head aggregates
the data without decrypting the ciphertexts recieved from its cluster members and transmits to the base station. The
base station decrypts the application speciﬁc data. CDAMA works in four phases, Key generate, encrypt, aggregate
and decrypt.
1) Key generate: This procedure generates (public key, private key) pair for each of the application by using elliptic
curve cryptography.
2) Encrypt: To encrypt the data each sensor node ﬁrst veriﬁes if the size of their sensed reading is less than acceptable
message size of the respective application, Ti . If size of message is veriﬁed, sensor node selects a random integer
R within range 0 to n − 1. The reading is encrypted and then the ciphertext is transmitted.
3) Aggregate: The cluster-head aggregates the two ciphertexts received by performing point addition asC = C1+C2
and transmits the ﬁnal aggregated ciphertext.
4) Decrypt: The base station performs decryption and then extracts aggregated message corresponding to
application i .
4. Problem Deﬁnition and System Model
4.1 Problem deﬁnition
The users of Wireless Sensor Networks normally are far away from the WSNs and interact through the Base Station
(Gateway) by injecting queries into the Sensor Networks. Multiple users may inject queries into the network through
sink. Normally, the Sink broadcasts query into the network, that is propagated throughout the network in a multi-hop
communication mode. An attacker snooping into the network can get the desired information by just listening to the
communication or can pretend as the Base Station and inject queries. Hence, the query must be transmitted in a secured
manner.
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Fig. 1. Deployment of Sensor Nodes.
There can be multiple sum based queries co-existing in the network. Sending the data related to each query
in separate packets involves high communication overhead. As discussed under Section 2 and 3, many algorithms
exists for optimizing and processing aggregate multiple queries. Transmission of aggregated data related to multiple
coexisting queries in separate packet may lead to larger energy depletion and hence reduce the overall network lifetime.
Hence secure aggregation of data belonging to different queries into a single aggregated packet is a challenging task.
4.2 System model and assumptions
This section discusses the network model and attack model and the assumptions made in designing the algorithm.
4.2.1 Network model
The Wireless Sensor Network consists of N sensor nodes randomly deployed in the network. The data generated
at sensor nodes are transmitted to the base station using multihop communication. The sensor network is assumed
to be heterogeneous consisting of high capacity sensors and low capacity sensors. The high capacity sensors act as
cluster-heads. The cluster-heads perform aggregation and forward the aggregated data to either another cluster-head
nearer to base station or to the base station itself.
Figure 1 shows a sample wireless sensor network with four clusters (represented by circles) each having a high-end
sensor acting as cluster-head and four or ﬁve low-end sensor nodes. The radius of the circles representing clusters is
equal to the communication range of the cluster-heads. The circle with the base station at the center is the top level of
hierarchy.
4.2.2 Query model
Multiple sum based queries may coexist in the Sensor Network. Multiple sum based queries are assumed to coexist
in the WSN. The following Scenario shows an example for the query model:
• User1 issues the query “SELECT SUM(TEMP) FROM sensors WHERE TEMP BETWEEN 50 AND 100”
• User2 issues the query “SELECT AVG(TEMP) FROM sensors”
The query model assumes that all the coexisting queries to be SUM based queries so that additively homomorphic
encryption can be applied. Query model also assumes that different queries may expect different types of data.
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4.2.3 Attack model
An algorithm intended to provide security must provide Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Authenticity as the basic
requirement. An attacker may launch various types of attacks to break conﬁdentiality, integrity and authenticity.
a) Attacks against Conﬁdentiality: An attacker tries to gain access to key by launching one of the following attacks
such as known plaintext attack, chosen ciphertext attack and chosen plaintext attack. Once the attacker gains
control over the key, the aggregated data can be decrypted.
b) Attack on Integrity: The attacker successfully compromises one or more cluster-heads or sensor nodes. The
compromised node may either drop some data or may change the aggregated result with the intention of
propagating false aggregate to the base station. eg: replay attack
c) Attack on Authenticity: There are two types of attacks that can form threat against authenticity; (i) The attacker
pretends to be base station and injects query into the network (ii) The attacker pretends to be a genuine sensor
node or aggregator and injects false data into the network.
We assume that a compromised sensor node may try to violate either integrity or authenticity of data. In public key
based cryptosystems even if the attacker gains the encryption key, it cannot be used for decryption. But this key can
be used to generate a false ciphertext in a valid format and thus violate integrity.
5. The SDAMQ Algorithm
Goal: The main goal of the algorithm is authenticated dissemination of queries and aggregation of data belonging
to different queries into a single packet while allowing the base station to retrieve the query speciﬁc aggregate.
The SDAMQ algorithm has three parts out of which two are performed at the base station.
5.1 Query dissemination
The user’s query is transformed at the base station to a format that can be understood by the sensor nodes.
Each query is uniquely identiﬁed by a query identiﬁer. The format of query message referred as Q is given
below:
〈Query, Predicate, Duration, Period〉
where Query speciﬁes the type of query (COUNT, SUM, AVERAGE, MEDIAN, STANDARD DEVIATION etc.),
and Predicate speciﬁes the query predicate. Duration is the duration of query i.e, how long the query lasts and
Period tells the regular intervals at which data is expected at the base station. For example if the duration is 2 hours
and period is 15 minutes, the sensor nodes transmit their sensed reading after every 15 minutes period to the base
station for next 2 hours. Each query is uniquely identiﬁed using an identiﬁer, QI D . The base station generates the
public key (PKQI D ), private key (SKQI D ) pair corresponding to each query QI D .
All the cluster-heads in the network and the base station share a common key (K ). The Base Station ﬁrst performs
a re-keying operation to generate authentication key for the current data collection round using which the Base Station
generates signature (σBS) as shown below:
σBS = HK(I D, QI D )
where H is a cryptographic hash function. The signature is used to authenticate the query origin. Once the keys and
signature are generated, the Base Station sends a query message consisting of the following ﬁelds:
〈QI D ,Q, PKQI D , σBS, T S〉
The Base Station broadcasts the query message corresponding to QI D . All nodes within the communication range
of base station receives the query.Whenever a cluster-head receives the query, it ﬁrst regenerates the key corresponding
to the query. After the re-keying operation is performed, the cluster-head generates the signature of base station
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Algorithm 1. SDAMQ: Secure Data Aggregation for Multiple Queries
σBS−I D . If the signature is veriﬁed, then the originator of the query is authenticated. After successful veriﬁcation,
the cluster-head (aggregators) rebroadcast the query. On receipt of query from respective cluster-heads, each sensor
node sets a timer inversely proportional to its level in the aggregation hierarchy for data transmission. This process is
repeated until all the cluster-heads in lowest level of hierarchy receives the query.
5.2 Data generation and aggregation
Each sensor node ﬁrst generates its reading and checks whether it has data to contribute for one of the queries.
If a sensor node say A, has data to contribute for this query QI D , it encrypts the data using public key generated
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Fig. 2. Average Energy Consumed vs. Network Size.
at base station for QI D , viz., PUQI D using elliptic-curve encryption. Each cluster-member generates a signature to
authenticate itself and its ciphertext using the key (KA) shared between itself and its cluster-headCH . The sensor node
A then sends its ciphertext and signature pair, (CA, σA) together in a message to its respective cluster-head, say CH .
When a cluster-head CH receives this message from a neighbor A, it ﬁrst veriﬁes the signature by generating
signature and comparing it with the received signature. If veriﬁcation is successful, the cluster-head aggregates the
received ciphertext with its own as follows:
CCH = CCH + CA
where CCH is the aggregated Ciphertext of the Cluster-head, CA is the ciphertext recieved from its member A and +
indicates point addition on elliptic curve.When the data transmission timer of the cluster-headCH expires, it generates
a signature authenticating itself and its ciphertext and sends its ciphertext, signature pair (CCH , σCH ) in a message.
5.3 Decryption
When the base station receives the (CCH , σCH ) message, it ﬁrst veriﬁes the signature as discussed before. Then it
aggregates the received ciphertexts. Finally, it decrypts the aggregated ciphertext using the private key corresponding
to query QPR by applying Pollard’s λ method. The SDAMQ algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
6. Results and Analysis
Simulations are performed on NS2 simulator. The metrics considered for comparison are 1) delay, 2) energy
consumption and 3) packet drop ratio with respect to network size, number of simultaneous queries and % of
compromised nodes. To compare the performance of SDAMQ two state-of-the-art algorithms, Lin et al.’s CDAMA14
and Chen et al.’s SafeQ7 are implemented. For attaining uniformity in simulation while implementing SafeQ, the data
centers are organized in multiple levels of hierarchy. So when query is issued from the base station, it is transmitted
to all data centers using multi-hop communication between data centers. The sensor nodes send their encrypted data
only to the data centers. Each data center collects data from ten sensor nodes.
6.1 Impact of network size on overall energy consumption
To analyse the impact of network size on total energy consumption, the network size is varied from 100 to 500
nodes with total number of parallel queries set to 2. Figure 2 shows a comparison of the performance of SafeQ7 and
SDAMQ. The highest energy consuming task of a sensor node is communication. For example, let three different
sum-based queries are issued from sink. If the queries are non-overlapping and have no common data, any query
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Fig. 3. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) vs. % of Compromised Nodes.
optimization technique processes it as independent aggregate queries. Different data packets are transmitted to the
Sink corresponding to each query. Hence in SafeQ, for each query separate messages will be sent to the base station
from the storage node. But in SDAMQ the data belonging to different independent queries are aggregated into single
packet and hence results in low communication overhead and hence results in reduction in energy consumption.
6.2 Impact of attack on packet delivery ratio
The resilience of the algorithm against Sink impersonation and false query injection attacks is shown in Fig. 3.
In CDAMA an aggregator fuses all data received irrespective of whether it is unauthenticated or old data and hence
the aggregated cipher text may include false contribution. Similarly in SafeQ, though the query is encoded, it cannot
detect a replay attack and hence transmits the result back to sink. On the other hand, SDAMQ is able to detect the false
query injection and replay attack. It drops all such packets that are not received within time threshold or does not pass
signature veriﬁcation. We can see that the packet drop ratio increases with increase in % of compromised nodes. This
shows that SDAMQ provides more resistance to replay attack and false data injection attack. A compromised node
cannot launch denial of service attack in SDAMQ.
7. Conclusions
This paper proposes SDAMQ: Secured Data Aggregation for Multiple Queries in Wireless Sensor Networks that
integrates multi-query aggregation with additively homomorphic encryption. Most of the multi-query aggregation
techniques aggregate data common to multiple queries by eliminating redundancy. The SDAMQ aggregates data
belonging to different queries and are of different types thereby reducing the overall energy consumption. SDAMQ
also performs authenticated query dissemination which ensures no false query is injected into the network. The
performance analysis shows that SDAMQ identiﬁes replay attack and drops all such malicious contribution from
getting aggregated. SDAMQ enforces all nodes to be authenticated and hence incurs a small delay. The performance of
SDAMQ is analyzed for two queries. An extension of SDAMQ can be studied by varying the number multiple queries.
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